Paradigm Shifts and Access Controls: An Economic Analysis of the Anticircumvention Provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act by Kern, Melissa A.
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform 
Volume 35
2002 
Paradigm Shifts and Access Controls: An Economic Analysis of 
the Anticircumvention Provisions of the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act 
Melissa A. Kern 
University of Michigan Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjlr 
 Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons, Law and Economics Commons, and the Legislation 
Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Melissa A. Kern, Paradigm Shifts and Access Controls: An Economic Analysis of the Anticircumvention 
Provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 35 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 891 (2002). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjlr/vol35/iss4/6 
 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform at 
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of 
Michigan Journal of Law Reform by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship 
Repository. For more information, please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
PARADIGM SHIFTS AND ACCESS CONTROLS:
AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE ANTICIRCUMVENTION
PROVISIONS OF THE DIGITAL MILLENNIUM
COPYRIGHT ACT
Melissa A. Kern*
This Note addresses the broadened scope of protection granted to copyright holders
under the anticircumvention provisions of the Digital Millenium Copyright Act of
1998 (DMCA). This broadened scope extends to copyright holders the right to con-
trol access to their works, diminishing the consumer's 'fair use" of those works that
previously served as a defense to alleged copyright infringements. While access con-
trols are supported by economists who believe they are useful in correcting market
inefficiencies and excluding free riders, this Note suggests that access controls can-
not correct all market inefficiencies. Furthermore, such access controls deny access
and use of copyrighted material that would otherwise be legal as fair use. Addi-
tionally, access controls can be used to lock up uncopyrighted public domain
material. The Note thus argues that the DMCA should be reformed so that access
controls are not applied to noninfringing uses. Part I of this Note discusses the
origins of the DMCA and its anticircumvention provisions. Part I discusses how
United States copyright doctrine has evolved away from a balancing approach and
toward one where copyrights are treated more like private property. Part III dis-
cusses the economic arguments in favor of access control provisions and why they
are not completely effective in achieving optimal levels of production and utiliza-
tion of copyrighted works. Finally, Part TV suggests how the DMCA should be
modified.
INTRODUCTION
Consider the following four scenarios:
SCENARIO 1: Suppose I legally purchase a DVD. I return home to
find out that the copyright holder has inserted fifteen minutes of
commercials before the movie. Unbeknownst to me when I pur-
chased the DVD, the DVD includes technology that will not allow
me to skip through the commercials to the beginning of the movie.
In order to avoid being bombarded with the ill-timed commercial
messages in the future, I use my superior programming skills to
bypass this technology so that I may watch, without unnecessary
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delay, my legally purchased DVD on my legally purchased DVD
player.
SCENARIO 2: Suppose I am developing a critical comparison of
the music of Skittle (an abrasive musician with offensive lyrics but
catchy melodies) with Litany Javelins (a provocatively attired teen-
age singing sensation with inane lyrics but catchy melodies). My
thesis is that Javelins' music is, like Skittle's music, degrading to
women. Not surprisingly, Javelins doesn't like my idea for a critical
comparison and refuses to let me use excerpts of her songs for my
analysis. I circumvent the technology that prohibits me from mak-
ing digital copies (off of my legally purchased and downloaded
copy) and incorporate samples of her music into my critical analy-
sis without her permission. MTV plays my critique and pays me
handsomely for the rights to it (i.e. I have financially profited from
my work).
SCENARIO 3: Suppose I am an ace reporter covering the city-beat
in the city of Hutchins. A confidential source informs me that
Company Y is hiding a major environmental catastrophe. He hands
me a computer disk with copies of Company Ys reports and photos
detailing the specifics of the disaster. Company Y, realizing the sen-
sitive nature of the information contained in the reports, has
protected them with access controls. I break the access controls
and also break the story in the local newspaper.I
SCENARIO 4: I am a renowned author of self-help books. My latest
offering, Only You Can Help Yourself-Why Self-Help Books are a Waste of
Money, is currently near the top of the best seller lists (behind The
Rules but in front of the latest Women are from Venus offering byJohn
Gray). I suspect that large portions of my book are being distributed
over the Internet self-help site www.selfhelpforeveryone.com. Only
members have access to the material on the web site. I circumvent
the technology keeping me from perusing the material on the web
site and discover that I was wrong: instead of excerpting pieces of my
book, my entire book is online.
Under all of these scenarios, by circumventing a "technological
measure that effectively controls access to a work," I have commit-
ted a federal crime under the anticircumvention provisions of the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 (DMCA) .2 If I am con-
victed under the DMCA and am found to have violated the
provisions "willfully and for purposes of commercial advantage or
1. This scenario was adapted from Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property and the Digi-
tal Economy: Why the Anti-Circumvention Regulations Need to Be Revised, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
519, 545 (1999).
2. 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (a) (1999).
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private financial gain," then I can be sent to prison for five years
and fined $500,000 for my first offense. If I am a repeat offender,
then the fine increases to $1,000,000 with up to ten years in federal
prison.4
The protection granted to copyright holders under the DMCA is
far more extensive than protection granted previously under the
Copyright Act.5 In Harper & Row Publishers v. Nation Enterprises, the
Supreme Court declared that
copyright does not prevent subsequent users from copying
from a prior author's work those constituent elements that
are not original-for example, quotations borrowed under
the rubric of fair use from other copyrighted works, facts, or
materials in the public domain-as long as such use does not
unfairly appropriate the author's original contributions.
After implementation of the DMCA, this statement is no longer
true. Unlike a cause of action for copyright infringement, fair use'
is not a defense to a cause of action for violating the DMCA's
anticircumvention provisions. Under the DMCA, copyright holders
have been granted a new right: to control consumer access to the
contents of their works.8 Unfortunately, access controls do not
discriminate between protectable and nonprotectable works.9
Consequently, there is no way to guarantee that access controls will
not prevent consumers from either (1) making legal use of
copyrighted material; or (2) making use of uncopyrightable
material contained in a work locked up by access controls.")
3. 17 U.S.C. § 1204(a) (1) (1999).
4. 17 U.S.C. § 1204(a) (2) (1999).
5. Neil Weinstock Netanel, From the Dead Sea Scrolls to the Digital Millennium; Recent De-
velopments in Copyright Law, 9 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 19, 20 (2000).
6. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 548 (1985).
7. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994). For a discussion of fair use see infra Part II.C.
8. 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (1999);JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 83 (2001).
9. Access controls are technical measures employed by copyright holders to prevent
unauthorized access to a given work. When such technical measures are in place, access to a
work requires "application of information, or a process or a treatment, with the authority of
the copyright owner." 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (a) (3) (B). Without authority of the copyright holder,
the measures can be circumvented by descrambling a scrambled work, decrypting an en-
crypted work, or otherwise avoiding, bypassing, removing, deactivating or impairing a
technological measure. 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (a) (3) (A). Consequently, access controls will not
prevent access to copyrighted works published in traditional mediums like books and news-
papers. However, to the extent a work is published exclusively in a format to which access
controls can be applied (e.g., digitally), access controls can effectively prevent unauthorized
access to a work.
10. LITMAN, supra note 8, at 83.
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The constitutional Framers envisioned a balancing approach to
copyright law. In recent years, copyright law has evolved away from
the balancing approach envisioned by the constitutional Framers
towards a market-based approach-grounded in economic analysis
of the law.1" Under the market-based approach, intellectual prop-
erty is treated like private property and control resides with the
copyright holder.12 Access controls assist copyright owners by con-
trolling access to their intellectual property, in much the same way
a fence keeps intruders from trespassing on real property. Thus,
access controls enable copyright holders to keep potentially un-
wanted and/or nonpaying users from using their copyrighted
works.
Economists argue that access controls can be justified theoreti-
cally because they correct market inefficiencies. From an
economic perspective, access controls are justified because they
allow producers to exclude "free riders.' '14 Free riders, precluded
from obtaining free access to a copyrighted work, must now pay for
it or go without. By forcing free riders to pay, producer's profits are
brought in line with the actual social benefits conferred by their
products.
Access controls, however, cannot cure all market inefficiencies.
The economic argument for access controls is predicated on the
following three assumptions: (1) information is perfect; (2) trans-
action costs are zero; and (3) parties act rationally. 1 5 In the market
for copyrighted works each of these assumptions fails. Conse-
quently, market inefficiencies will still exist.
Under a market-based system utilizing access controls certain
users will be denied access to, and thereby use of, copyrighted ma-
terial that would otherwise be legal to use. Additionally, access
controls could lock up public domain material not subject to copy-
right. Consequently, the access control provisions of the DMCA
require modification so that they are not applied to bar nonin-
fringing uses.
In Part I, this Note will discuss the origins of the DMCA and its
anticircumvention provisions. In Part II, it will discuss how United
States copyright doctrine has evolved away from a balancing ap-
proach and toward one where copyrights are treated more like
private property. Part III will discuss the economic arguments in
favor of access control provisions and why they are not completely
11. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 568.
12. See discussion infra Part III.D.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
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effective in achieving optimal levels of production and utilization
of copyrighted works. Finally, Part IV will suggest how the DMCA
should be modified.
I. DIGITAL MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT
The DMCA was precipitated by an international treaty. On De-
cember 20, 1996, the World Intellectual Property Organization
(WIPO) Diplomatic Conference on Certain Copyright and
Neighboring Rights Questions adopted the WIPO Copyright Treaty
(WCT) .16 The United States ratified the WCT in September 1999.
The WCT addresses some of the problems copyright owners
confronted once digitization made copying quick, easy, and cost-
free. To address these problems, the WCT establishes several re-
quirements that must be met by each signatory country's copyright
law.17 Signatory countries are free to construct their own laws to
comply with the treaty requirements as the WCT combines supra-
national substantive rules with the principal of national treatment.
Supranational substantive rules cover both rights afforded and sub-
ject matter protected. National treatment means that a foreign
work will receive the same protection as would a local work.
Under the WCT, authors of literary and artistic works are given
the exclusive right to communicate their works to the public. 8 Ad-
ditionally, authors are given the exclusive right to control the
making and distribution of copies in digital format.' 9 Significantly,
signatory countries can
continue to apply existing exceptions and limitations, such as
fair use, as appropriate in the digital environment, and can
even create new exceptions and limitations appropriate to the
digital environment.
2°
Most importantly for this discussion, countries adopting the
WCT must
16. WIPO Copyright Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, WIPO Doc. CRNR/DC/94 (Dec. 23, 1996)
[hereinafter WIPO WCT].
17. See generally WIPO WCT.
18. WIPO WCT, art. 6.
19. WIPO WCT, art. 8.
20. Samuelson, supra note 1, at 528 (interpreting WIPO WCT, art. 10).
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provide adequate legal protection and effective legal remedies against
the circumvention of effective technological measures that are
used by authors in connection with the exercise of their rights
[under the treaty].'
Legal scholars have debated whether or not existing U.S. copy-
right law provided all of the protections for copyright owners
required by the WCT. For instance, Pamela Samuelson has argued
that copyright cases already recognized rights of authors to control
both digital reproductions and digital transmissions of their
works." Similarly, Jessica Litman has argued that "the availability of
infringement actions against circumventers who succeeded in vio-
lating copyright owners' rights, together with the possibility of
suing makers of devices that had no legitimate use, met the stan-
dard set by the [WIPO Copyright] treaty."23
In fact, both the U.S. Department of Commerce and the Clinton
Administration initially considered sending the treaty "clean" to
the U.S. Senate for ratification without implementing legislation. 4
Copyright holders objected and insisted that the "effective legal
remedies" requirement meant that they should have the legal abil-
ity to prevent all circumvention of technical protection measures-
despite language in the WCT allowing signatory countries to main-
tain existing exceptions such as fair use.2' According to copyright
owners, under the WCT, the reason for the circumvention was ir-
relevant. Additionally, they argued that the treaty required
prohibition of all devices capable of facilitating illegal circumven-
21. WIPO WCT, art. 11.
22. Samuelson, supra note 1, at 530.
23. LITMAN, supra note 8, at 131. Litman maintained that no additional legislation was
necessary since copyright infringement accomplished by circumvention of technical meas-
ures was already actionable under U.S. law as copyright infringement. Id. Additionally,
producers of devices that had no substantial noninfringing uses who knowingly facilitated
copyright infringement would be subject to copyright infringement liability. Id. (citing A&M
Records v. Abdalla, 948 E Supp. 1449 (C.D. Cal. 1996)). However, in Sony Corp. of America v.
Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 434-42 (1984), the Supreme Court refused to hold
the video tape recorder (VTR) manufacturers liable. Even though the VTR could be used to
make illegal copies of copyrighted material, it was also capable of substantial noninfringing
uses. Id.
24. LITMAN, supra note 8, at 130; Samuelson, supra note 1, at 530 n.61 (citing Clinton
Administration Is Undecided On Implementing Steps For WIPO Treaties, 53 BNA PAT., TRADEMARK
& COPYRIGHTJ. 241 (1997)).
25. WIPO WCT, art. 10 provides:
Contracting Parties may, in their national legislation, provide for limitations of or ex-
ceptions to the rights granted to authors of literary and artistic works under this
Treaty in certain special cases that do not conflict with a normal exploitation of the
work and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the author.
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tion-regardless of whether or not the devices were capable of be-
26ing used for other legitimate purposes.
In the end, copyright holders appear to have prevailed. Con-
.gress enacted the DMCA on October 28, 1998 in fulfillment of its
treaty obligations. Title I of the DMCA prohibits circumvention of
access control technologies used by copyright owners to protect
their works. Specifically, subsection 1201 (a) (1) (A) provides, that
"[n]o person shall circumvent a technological measure that effec-
tively controls access to a work protected under this title."
27
Violation of subsection 1201 (a) (1) (A) is both a federal crime 28 and
291the basis for a civil cause of action .
The DMCA was not without exceptions. Seven exceptions to the
anticircumvention provisions were expressly enumerated:
1. Security testing;
2. Exemption for nonprofit libraries, archives, and
educational institutions;
31
3. Exemption for law enforcement, intelligence, and
other governmental activities;32
26. LITMAN, supra note 8, at 131.
27. 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (a) (1) (A).
28. 17 U.S.C. § 1204 (1999). Any person who willfully violates the anticircumvention
provisions found in § 1201 "for the purposes of commercial advantage or private financial
gain" can be fined up to $500,000 or imprisoned up to five years for a first offense. Id.
Second time offenders face up to a $1,000,000 fine and imprisonment up to ten years. Id.
The risk of substantial imprisonment time for violation the statute should deter many
people from challenging the constitutionality of the statute. In 1999, the United States
Department of Justice declared prosecution of IP crimes to be a "major law enforcement
priority." David Goldstone, Deciding Whether to Prosecute an Intellectual Property Case, U.S.
DEP'T. OFJUSTICE, 49 U.S. ATTORNEYS' USA BULLETIN 2 (Mar. 2001), available at http://
www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/usamarch200l_l.htm. According to a recent DOJ
publication:
IP crime always has a direct victim (the IP holder) and undermines the IP system as
a whole (like counterfeiting money).... Because IP crime can be perpetrated
without any direct contact with the victim IP holder . . ., the direct victim of IP
crime is basically defenseless against IP theft. ... IP rights, such as . .. copyright,
are in part created by federal law and ... are thus of special federal interest .... Ef-
fective enforcement of IP laws is essential to the foundation of the growing
information economy.
Id.
29. 17 U.S.C. § 1203 (1999). Courts are entitled to grant temporary or permanent
injunctions, may order impounding of allegedly infringing devices or products, award
damages, and order destruction of devices or products found in violation of § 1201. Id.
30. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(j).
31. 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (d).
32. 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (e).
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4. Reverse engineering;3
5. Encryption research;34
6. Exceptions regarding minors;, and
7. Protection of personally identifying information.
While at first glance these exceptions appear to be quite broad,
they are in fact extremely narrow. For example, the security testing
exception is limited to "good faith testing, investigating, or correct-
ing, a security flaw or vulnerability." ' This exemption is further
limited by the requirement that the circumventer first obtain per-
38
mission of the owner of the computer system or software.
Similarly narrow is the exemption titled "Exemption for non-
profit libraries, archives, and educational institutions."33  This
exemption permits circumvention for the sole purpose of making a
good faith determination as to whether a library should acquire a
copy of that work. 40 Towards that end, a copy obtained by a library
may only be retained long enough to make a good faith determi-
nation of whether or not to acquire permanent access and may not
be used for any other purpose.41 However, circumvention is alto-
gether prohibited if another copy is reasonably available.
In addition to the expressly enumerated exceptions in the
DMCA, lawmakers also provided for additional, changing excep-
tions through use of a fail-safe mechanism. This mechanism was
designed to
monitor developments in the marketplace for copyrighted
materials, and allow the enforceability of the prohibition
against the act of circumvention to be selectively waived, for
limited time periods, if necessary to prevent a diminution in
33. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(f).
34. 17 U.S.C. § 120 1 (g).
35. 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (h).
36. 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (i).
37. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(j).
38. Id. The original draft of the DMCA contained an exemption only for law enforce-
ment purposes, because drafters realized that many common law enforcement activities
would be outlawed by the DMCA. Samuelson, supra note 1, at 535. Congress carved out the
security testing exemption when it figured out that under the DMCA many companies
would be unable to security test their own software without violating the anticircumvention
provisions of the DMCA. Id. at 535-36.
39. 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (d).
40. 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (d).
41. 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (d) (A), (B).
[VOL. 35:4
Paradigm Shifts and Access Controls
the availability to individual users of a particular category ofS 41
copyrighted materials.
The fail-safe mechanism was implemented in section
1201 (a) (1) (B) and provides that the prohibition against
circumvention
shall not apply to persons who are users of a copyrighted
work which is in a particular class of works, if such persons
are, or are likely to be in the succeeding 3-year period, adversely af-
fected by virtue of such prohibition in their ability to make
noninfringing uses of that particular class of works under
this title.43
During the two years prior to October 28, 2000, the Librarian
of Congress conducted a rulemaking proceeding to determine
whether persons who are users of a copyrighted work are, or
are likely to be in the succeeding 3-year period, adversely af-
fected by the prohibition in [1201 (a) (1) (A)] in their ability
to make noninfringing uses under this particular class of
copyrighted works."
The Librarian was instructed to carve out exemptions to the pro-
visions of 1201 (a) (1) (A) that would last for a three-year period
beginning October 28, 2000.4  After three years these exemptions
will be reviewed de novo.4
42. Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems for Ac-
cess Control Technologies; Final Rule, 65 Fed. Reg. 64,556, 64,558 (Copyright Office, Library
of Congress, Oct. 27, 2000) [hereinafter Exemption to Circumvention].
43. 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (emphasis added). The fail-safe exemption was the result of legisla-
tive compromise between the Judiciary Committee and Commerce Committee. Despite the
WCT's instruction that signatory countries could "in their national legislation, provide for
limitations of or exceptions to the rights granted to authors of literary and artistic works,"
WIPO WCT art. 8, supra note 16. The original DMCA that came out of the Judiciary Commit-
tee had no provision for fair use. Although the Judiciary Committee usually dealt with
copyright matters, the Commerce Committee became involved when it realized the DMCA
went far beyond copyright since it contained prohibitions against the manufacture and sale of
devices. Additionally, the Commerce Committee had in recent years had jurisdiction over is-
sues of Internet and electronic commerce. Only after the Commerce Committee became
involved was the fail-safe exemption provision added to the final version of the DMCA. For a
detailed discussion of the DMCA's progress through Congress, see LITMAN, supra note 8, at
122-45.
44. 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (a) (1) (C).
45. 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (a).
46. 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (a) (1) (D).
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On October 27, 2000, the Librarian of Congress issued its Final
Rule, Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright
Protection Systems for Access Control Technologies.47 In this final
rulemaking, the Librarian of Congress adopted two narrow ex-
emptions to section 1201:
1. Compilations consisting of lists of websites blocked
by filtering software applications;4 and
2. Literary works, including computer programs and
databases, protected by access control mechanisms
that fail to permit access because of malfunction,
damage or obsoleteness.4 9
In adopting these two exemptions, the Librarian rejected sev-
eral proposed exemptions including those for:
1. "thin copyright" works;5
0
2. sole source works;
5
3. audiovisual works on digital versatile discs
(DVDs) ;5
2
4. video games in formats playable only on dedicated
platforms;
53
5. computer programs or other digital works for pur-
poses of reverse engineering;54
6. encryption research purposes;55
7. "fair use" works;
5 6
47. Exemption to Circumvention, 65 Fed. Reg. at 64,556.
48. Id. at 64,564.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 64,566. Thin copyright works "are works consisting primarily (but not entirely)
of matter unprotected by copyright such as U.S. government works or works whose term of
copyright protection has expired, or works for which copyright protection is 'thin,' such as
factual works." Id.
51. Id. at 64,567. Sole source works are copyrighted works available only from a single
source making them available only in a form protected by access controls. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 64,570.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 64,571.
56. Id. at 64,570. For a discussion of fair use see Parts II.C and II.D infra.
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8. material that cannot be archived or preserved; 7
9. works embodied in copies which have been law-
fully acquired by users who subsequently seek to
make noninfringing uses thereof;"8
10. exemption for public broadcasting entities.59
The most common reasons for rejecting these proposed ex-
emptions were: (1) failure of the proposed exception to meet the
"class of works" requirement; and (2) failure to show actual
harm.60 The "class of works" requirement emanated from the lan-
guage in 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (a) (1) (C), which required the Librarian
to base exemptions on a "particular class of copyrighted works."6'
The Librarian interpreted that language to mean that "a class
must be defined primarily by reference to attributes of the works
themselves, typically based upon categories set forth in section
102(a) or some subset thereof...2 Accordingly, exemptions
should begin with a section 102(a) category or subset of a section
102(a) category.63
Once a section 102(a) category had been identified, it could be
limited by (1) attributes of the works themselves; (2) reference to
a medium; or (3) the access control measures applied.64 For ex-
ample, according to the Librarian the following exemption would
meet the class of works requirement: Motion Pictures (a subset of
the § 102 (a) category Literary Works) distributed on DVDs (ref-
erence to a distribution medium) using content scrambling
system of access control (access control measures applied) .G
Regardless of whether or not the user's ability to access works
were adversely impacted, those exemptions that failed were
(1) referenced solely by the medium in which the work appears,
(2) based solely on the type of access control measure applied to
57. Id. at 64,572.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 64,573.
60. The DMCA's anticircumvention provisions did not go into effect until October 28,
2000-two )'ears after its enactment. 17 U.S.C. 1201(a) (1) (A). Since the anticircumvention
provisions had not yet become effective at the time the Final Rule was issued, it is not surpris-
ing that the Librarian had trouble finding actual harm warranting a three-year exception.
61. Exemption to Circumvention, 65 Fed. Reg. at 64,559-62.
62. Id. at 64,562.
63. Section 102(a) categories include: (1) literary works; (2) musical works, (3) dra-
matic works; (4) pantomimes and choreographic works; (5) pictorial, graphic, and
sculptural works; (6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works; (7) sound recordings;
and (8) architectural works. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
64. Exemption to Circumvention, 65 Fed. Reg. at 64,559-61.
65. Id.
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a work, or (3) determined by type of use or user."6 Consequently,
the following proposed exemptions failed the class of works
requirement as interpreted by the Librarian:
* "thin copyright" works, sole source works,
* "fair use" works,
* material that cannot be archived or preserved,
" works embodied in copies which have been lawfully
acquired by users who subsequently seek to make
noninfringing uses thereof, and
exemption for public broadcasting.
Proposed exemptions that could surmount the class of works re-
quirement were rejected for failure to show "adverse effects on
noninfringing uses that such an exemption would remedy., 67 Ac-
cording to the Librarian, pay-per-use business models facilitated by
the DMCA may even be use-facilitating:6
For example, if consumers are given a choice between paying
$100 for permanent access to a work or $2 for each individual
occasion on which they access the work, many will probably
find it advantageous to elect the "pay-per-use" option, which
may make access to the work much more widely available than
it would be in the absence of such an option.69
66. Id. at 64,566-73.
67. Id. at 64,562. It is interesting to note that the Librarian seemed to require a show-
ing of actual harm. By contrast, the statute merely requires a showing that persons would be
"likely to be in the succeeding 3-year period, adversely affected .. " 17 U.S.C.
§ 1201(a)(1)(B) (emphasis added). For example, when rejecting the proposed exemption
for "fair use works," the Librarian stated that "[a]lthough the proponents of this exemption
allege that if they are prevented from circumventing these particular classes of works, they
... will not be able to exercise fair use as to this class of works, they have not demonstrated that
they have been unable to engage in such uses because of access control measures." Id. at 64,571-72
(emphasis added).
68. Id. at 64,564.
69. Id. The Librarian's statement will be true when
N*(T+C) < S
where N = number of uses by a copyright user; T = transaction/search costs associated with
each use; C = cost of use for each occasion access is desired; and S = cost for permanent
access. The introduction of a pay-per-use business model adds transaction and search costs
to each occasion a use or access is desired.
[VOL. 35:4
Paradigm Shifts and Access Controls
Therefore, the Librarian concluded that "the flexibility offered by
such 'persistent' access controls [could] actually enhance use." 70
In such rationale, the market-based approach to copyright is ap-
parent. Exemptions will be granted only if the market has not
adequately addressed the needs of copyright users. However, if a
market could adequately support consumer's uses of copyrighted
works, no exemption will be allowed.
As to the exemptions rejected for failure to show actual or likely
harm, the Librarian noted that it was no surprise that so few ex-
emptions were found since "adverse effect on users of copyrighted
works" required to get an exemption was merely speculative since
circumvention was not even unlawful until October 28, 2000."
A market-based approach was expressly used by the Librarian for
the two exemptions carved out under the fail-safe exemptions. The
Librarian explained that the two exemptions approved were war-
ranted because the market had not adequately addressed
consumer's noninfringing uses "either because companies go out
of business or because they have insufficient incentive to support
access controls on their products at some point after the initial sale
or license. 72
II. THE TREND TOWARDS A MARKET-BASED
APPROACH TO COPYRIGHT
The enactment of the DMCA has continued a trend of expand-
ing the rights of copyright owners at the expense of copyright
users. United States copyright law has evolved from a balancing ap-
proach, where copyright holders and copyright users each had
substantial rights, to a market-based approach-grounded in eco-
nomic analysis-under which copyright holders are awarded
almost complete control over their intellectual property. In doing
so, intellectual property has come to be treated more like private
property.
This section will discuss how copyright law has evolved so that
copyrighted works are treated like private property. First, it will
70. Id. at 64,564.
71. Id. at 64,563. The next rulemaking is scheduled for October 28, 2003. After three
years of anticircumvention technology being enforced, it may be easier to prove that users
are adversely effected by the DMCA. Legislation would seem to be required to overcome the
hurdle imposed by the Librarian's interpretation of the "class of works requirement."
72. Id. at 64,565.
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discuss copyright law generally, then it will discuss how market-
based approaches have been applied in fair use analysis, specifically
in terms of the fourth fair use factor. Finally, it will discuss how the
DMCA, by excluding fair use, has further facilitated a market-based
approach to copyright law.
A. Copyright Law Generally
The Constitution provides that Congress shall have power "[t] o
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for
limited Time to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries.",73 The Framers believed that a
balance should be struck between authors and the public. The ob-
ject was to foster development and access; creation of the
monopoly right was merely the means to that end.74 Consequently,
instead of granting intellectual property rights to authors similar to
those granted to real property owners (which last forever), the
Framers granted authors fixed "exclusive rights" that would last
only for a "limited time."75
As envisioned by the Framers, the purpose of copyright was not
to "reward the author, but [was] rather to secure 'the general
benefits derived by the public from the labors of authors.' , 76 The
authorization to grant limited monopolies to authors is based on
the beliefs that (1) the public will benefit from the creative activi-
ties of authors; and (2) a copyright monopoly is necessary in order
for the benefits of such creative activities to be fully realized. 77 "The
73. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
74. "[T] he Framers intended copyright itself to be the engine of free expression. By
establishing a marketable right to the use of one's expression, copyright supplies the eco-
nomic incentive to create and disseminate ideas." Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation
Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 548 (1985).
75. Lawrence Lessig, The Limits of Copyright, THE STANDARD, June 19, 2000, at
www.thestandard.com. Unlike rights in real property which last forever, copyright lasts only
for "limited times" before being dedicated to the public domain. Unlike the law of eminent
domain which requires homeowners to be compensated if their property is seized, the Con-
stitution requires that copyrights pass into the public domain after limited times without
compensation. Id.
76. MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, I NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.03[A]
(2001) (quoting Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932)).
77. 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 76, § 1.03[A]. The Supreme Court stated the
purpose as follows:
The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant patents
and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal
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monopoly created by copyright thus rewards the individual author
in order to benefit the public."'78 Consequently, without such public
benefits, the granting of private copyright monopolies to individu-
als would be unjustified.79
The "limited times" provision was an attempt by the Framers to
balance two competing interests: (1) the author's interest in reap-
ing the fruits of his labor; and (2) the public's interest in
"ultimately claiming free access to the materials essential to the
development of society."8 The Supreme Court explained that the
constitutional grant for "limited times" works as follows:
This limited grant is a means by which an important public in-
terest may be achieved. It is intended to motivate the creative
activity of authors and inventors by provision of a special re-
ward, and to allow the public access to the products of their
genius after the limited period of exclusive control had ex-
pired.8'
The First Congress enacted the first copyright protection in
1790.82 In the Copyright Act of 1790 (1790 Act), like the Framers,
Congress was concerned with striking an appropriate balance
between the public and authors. Accordingly, the 1790 Act gave
authors exclusive rights to publish and sell "maps, charts or books"
for fourteen years. Such protection was only granted if the author
complied with strict registration requirements. 84 The author was
entitled to a fourteen-year renewal period if he survived the first
term and complied with more administrative procedures.
gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the talents of authors and in-
ventors in "Science and useful Arts."
Id. (quoting Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954)).
78. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 546 (quoting Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City
Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984)).
79. id.
80. 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 76, § 1.05 [D].
81. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 546 (quoting Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City
Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984)).
82. Copyright Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (repealed).
83. Lessig, supra note 75. The 1790 Act did not regulate other kinds of writings. Im-
portantly, uses of writings that it did regulate were not restricted. Id. Besides limiting
competition, the 1790 Act gave the author no real control over his work once published. Id.
84. The author was protected if: (1) prior to publication, he recorded the title at the
district court where he resided; (2) published a copy of the record in a newspaper for four
weeks; and (3) deposited a copy of the work at the office of the Secretary of State within six
months after publication. Copyright Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, §§ 3-4, 1 Stat. 124, 125
(repealed).
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Importantly, the 1790 Act did not give copyright holders rights to
815
control how their writings were used by copyright users. Besides
limiting competition, the 1790 Act gave the author no real control
over his work once published. Therefore, one was free to create
derivative works and copy works protected without permission of
the author."6
In between 1790 and the first major revision of the copyright
laws in 1909, Congress amended the 1790 Act several times.
Amendments had given copyright protection to more subject mat-
ter s7 and had lengthened the term of copyright to an initial period
of twenty-eight years with a fourteen-year renewal period. The 1909
Copyright Act continued to expand statutory copyright rights. The
fourteen-year renewal period was extended by fourteen years, re-
sulting in a maximum possible term of fifty-six years."s In return for
these exclusive rights, the public was guaranteed immediate public
dissemination of the work and eventual dedication of the work in
its entirety to the "public domain."
8 9
Until the 1970s,90 "[c]opyright was seen as designed to be full of
holes."9  The public and copyright holder shared the benefits. Each
was entitled to retain the portion that would maximize the creation
of new works of authorship. 2 Since then, the idea of a bargain be-
tween copyright holders and users has gradually been replaced
with a model based on an economic analysis of the law.93 Under an
economic model, authors' rights are treated like property rights
instead of a bargain between owners and users.94 Copyright is char-
acterized as a series of incentives for the purpose of creating more
works of authorship.95 Accordingly, "[c]opyright has been trans-
formed into the right of a property owner to protect what is
85. Id.
86. Lessig, supra note 75.
87. Much of the new subject matter had been already added to the 1790 Act via
amendment. New subject matter included: (1) prints; (2) musical compositions (excluding
the public performance right); (3) photographs; (4) drawings, sculpture, and models or
designs for works of the fine arts. Copyright Act of 1870, 16 Stat. 212, Rev. Stat. §§ 4948-71.
88. Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, § 23, 35 Stat. 1075, 1080.
89. LITMAN, supra note 8, at 78 (referring to London v. Biograph, 231 E 696 (1916)).
90. In 1976, Congress enacted a comprehensive revision to the copyright act. Again
the term of copyright was extended, this time a copyright was to be measured by the life of
the author plus fifty years. Authors were granted rights to terminate any transfer after thirty-
five years. Notice was still required, but the requirement was somewhat relaxed. See 17 U.S.C.
§ 101, 203, 302 (1994).
91. LITMAN, supra note 8, at 79.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 81.
95. Id. at 80.
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rightfully hers." "3 While this approach is consistent with John
Locke's "natural right" theory that is fundamental to the theory of
private property, it is not at all clear that this approach was in-
tended by the Constitution's Framers.
For a variety of reasons, including international treaty obliga-
tions,"" the United States eventually relaxed the stringent
prerequisites that had to be fulfilled in order to get copyright pro-
tection." Subsequently, its focus has shifted away from a model
based on balancing competing interests to a compensation-based
model. Under the compensation model, copyright became a way to
ensure that authors made enough money from their creative works
so that they would make them available to the public and create
more works. The public enticed authors to create works by giving
them limited exclusive rights over their works.' ° Copyright did not
remove from the public access to any material it might want to use
to create new works of authorship.""
B. The DMCA
The economic model of copyright and the idea of copyright as
private property has continued to take hold. 102 Consequently, Con-
gress has continued to expand the rights accorded to copyright
holders. 1 3 By the time of the DMCA's enactment, a United States
copyright conferred the right to:
96. Id. at 81. By focusing on how to protect what is rightfully theirs, copyright holders
have successfully avoided the question of what ought to be rightfully theirs. Id.
97. 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 76, § 1.03[A].
98. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, 1971, art. 5,
para. 2 (requiring that the "enjoyment and exercise of [the rights conferred under the con-
vention] shall not be subject to any formality."). The Berne Convention was implemented by
the Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988. Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853
(Oct. 31, 1988).
99. Id.
100. Copyright owner could control only particular uses, in particular, duplication, pub-
lication, and public performance. LITMAN, supra note 8, at 78-79. Importantly, authors did
not have control over: reading, private performance, resale. Id. at 79.
101. Id.
102. In 1992, a Senate report explicitly rejected as contrary to the purpose of copyright
protect the idea that the real purpose of copyright was to benefit the public by increasing
the number of works in the public domain. 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 76,
§ 1.03[A] n. 4.1 (discussing S. REP. No. 102-194, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1991)).
103. In 1999, the term of copyright was extended to life plus seventy years. Sonny Bono
Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. 105-298, § 102(b), 112 Stat. 2827 (Oct. 27, 1998),
codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 302, 303, 304.
SUMMER 2002]
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
1) reproduce copyrighted works;
2) prepare derivative works;
3) distribute copies;
4) perform literary, musical, dramatic, and choreo-
graphic works, pantomimes and other audiovisual
works publicly;
5) display publicly; and
6) perform sound recordings publicly.10
4
With the enactment of the DMCA, Congress carved out even
more significant rights for copyright holders. For the first time, a
copyright holder can now control access to a work in which he or
she holds the copyright. 10 The anticircumvention provisions con-
tained in 17 U.S.C. 1201(a), allow a copyright owner to prohibit
the circumvention of protection measures-even if the measures are
not designed to protect exclusive rights of copyright, but are de-
signed simply to prevent acts that copyright owners do not want to
permit. 106
Thus, the anticircumvention provisions act to expand the rights
of copyright holders at the expense of copyright users. While this
expansion of copyright holder's rights is clearly consistent with the
trend to treat copyright owner's rights like property, this expansion
of rights is arguably inconsistent with the historical purposes of
copyright law.
C. Fair Use
Like the entire body of copyright law, the fair use doctrine has
also evolved from an equitable, fairness-based doctrine to a doctrine
based on economic analysis of the law. The fair use doctrine initially
developed as an "equitable rule of reason, [where] no generally ap-
plicable definition is possible, and each case raising the question
must be decided on its own facts."1 0 7 The common law doctrine of
fair use was defined as "a privilege in others than the owner of the
104. 17 U.S.C. § 106.
105. In addition, access to noncopyrighted public domain materials can be restricted to
the extent these works can be locked up using access controls.
106. Section 1201 (a) (1) (A) provides that "no person shall circumvent a technological
measure that effectively controls access to a work protected under this title." Traditional
exceptions allowed under the Copyright Act such as fair use are not exempted under this
language. See discussion infra notes 145-46 and accompanying text.
107. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 65-55.
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copyright to use the copyrighted material in a reasonable manner
without his consent."0 8 Fair use "permit[ted] courts to avoid rigid
application of the copyright statute, when on occasion, it would stifle
the very creativity which the law is designed to foster."' °9
The doctrine of fair use was first recognized as a judicial doc-
trine."0 The common law doctrine was codified for the first time in
section 107 of the Copyright Act of 1976."' Section 107 was "in-
tended to restate the [pre-existing] judicial doctrine of fair use, not
to change, narrow, or enlarge it in any way." 12 To determine
whether a particular use is fair under section 107, a case-by-case
analysis is required. Four nonexclusive factors listed in section 107
are to be considered in the fair use analysis." 3
108. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 549 (1985) (quot-
ing H. BALL, LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND LITERARY PROPERTY 260 (1944)).
109. Ia. State Univ. Research Found., Inc. v. Am. Broad. Cos., 621 F.2d 57, 60 (2d Cir.
1980). The Supreme Court quoted this language in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510
U.S. 569, 577 (1994).
110. Justice Story gave the following description:
[A] reviewer may fairly cite largely from the original work, if his design be really and
truly to use the passages for the purposes of fair and reasonable criticism. On the
other hand, it is as clear, that if he thus cites the most important parts of the work,
with a view, not to criticise, but to supersede the use of the original work, and substi-
tute the review for it, such use will be deemed in law a piracy.
Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 344-45 (D. Mass. 1841).
111. 17 U.S.C. § 107. Section 107 provides:
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the fair use of a copy-
righted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by
any other means specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism, comment,
news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship,
or research, is not an infringement of copyright. In determining whether the use
made of a work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall
include-
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of
a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copy-
righted work. The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a
finding of fair use if such finding is made upon consideration of all the
above factors.
112. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 549 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, p. 66).
113. 17 U.S.C. § 107(1)-(4); see Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S.
417, 448 (1984) ('Section 107 identifies various factors that enable a Court to apply an 'eq-
uitable rule of reason' analysis to particular claims of infringement.").
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The original approach to fair use analysis was consistent with the
balancing approach the Framers intended for copyright law. Rea-
sonable appropriations that advanced the public interest were
likely to be found to be fair use."4 Fair use was likely to be found in
two situations: "implied assent" and "enforced consent."' 5 In "im-
plied assent" situations the author would likely authorize use of his
work, but it would take a great deal of time and to ask permission.
For example, an author would likely consent to quotes being ex-
cerpted from his book for a favorable book review. Additionally,
fair use would likely be found when an individual user makes a
photocopy of a portion of a book for personal use. Implied assent
was seen as a
necessary incident of the constitutional policy of promoting
the progress of science and the useful arts, since a prohibition
of such use would inhibit subsequent writers from attempting
to improve upon prior works and thus ... frustrate the very
ends sought to be attained."6
In addition to "implied assent" situations, fair use was also likely
to be found in situations where the copyright holder would likely
deny, or actually did deny,"7 permission to use a work. Application
in those cases would result in judicial enforcement of the copyright
holder's consent. For example, an author would be unlikely to
allow a parody critical of his work."8 In such cases, the courts would
in effect enforce the author's consent." )
114. I.ITMAN, supra note 8, at 84.
115. See, e.g., cases cited infra note 118 (enforced consent) and note 116 (implied assent).
116. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 549 (quoting H. BALL, supra note 108, at 260).
117. See, e.g., Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assoc., 293 F. Supp. 130, 146 (S.D.N.Y 1968)
(holding that defendant's unauthorized publication of certain Zapruder film frames in his
book critical of the Warren Commission report was fair use).
118. See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994). In Acuff-Rose, the
Iap Mnusic group, 2-Live Crew Tote a song entitled "Pretty Woman" which was intended to
parody the original song performed by Roy Orbison by showing how "bland and banal the
Orbison song" was. Id. at 573. An offer to pay a fee for the use of it was refused by the copy-
right holder, Acuff-Rose. The Court held that "parody, like other comment or criticism, may
claim fair use under § 107." Id. at 579. The Court stated that:
Parody's humor, or in any event its comment, necessarily springs from a recognizable
allusion to its object through distorted imitation.... When parody takes aim at a par-
ticular original work, the parody must be able to "conjure up" at least enough of that
original to make the object of its critical wit recognizable.
Id. at 588. In doing so, the Court rejected Acuff-Rose's argument that 2-Live Crew's request
for permission to use the lyrics should be weighed against fair use.
119. 4 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 76, § 13.05 (declaring the suggestion that
fair use is based on the "implied or tacit consent of the author" to be "manifestly a fiction").
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Today, the trend is away from an "equitable rule of reason" ap-
proach and towards a market-based inquiry. In Harper & Row
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises,120 the Supreme Court first ex-
pressly suggested that the purpose of fair use doctrine was to
correct a systematic market failure. In that case, The Nation maga-
zine published an article on President Ford's pardon of former
President Richard Nixon. The Nation's article contained quotes it
knew to be from a purloined manuscript of President Ford's mem-
oirs. Time Magazine had contracted with Harper & Row (the
publisher of the memoirs) for the right to prepublish excerpts in
its magazine and had agreed to pay money in advance plus an ad-
ditional $12,500 after publication. After their publication in The
Nation, Time canceled its scheduled publication of the excerpts and
refused to pay the remaining $12,500. Harper & Row sued Nation
Enterprises for copyright infringement. Nation Enterprises argued
its publication was fair use.
After an extensive analysis of common law doctrine, legislative
history, and section 107, the Supreme Court rejected Nation En-
terprises' fair use arguments and held that The Nation had
infringed Harper & Row's copyright when it printed excerpts from
the purloined manuscript. Of particular relevance to this paper
was the Court's discussion and analysis of the fourth fair use factor:
"the effect of the use on the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work.",12 The Supreme Court found Harper & Row
had established a prima facie case of actual effect on the market
which The Nation was unable to rebut.'22 Time's cancellation of the
contract and refusal to pay $12,500 were the direct result of The
Nation's copyright infringement. Thus, Harper & Row had pre-
sented "clear-cut evidence of actual damage.'
123
120. 471 U.S. 539, 566 n.9 (1985).
121. The Court declared the fourth factor to be "undoubtedly the single most impor-
tant element of fair use." Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 566. But see WILLIAM F. PATRY, THE FAIR
USE PRIVILEGE IN COPYRIGHT LAW 561-65 (2d ed. 1995) (disputing the veracity of this state-
ment).
The Court apparently recognized their error and abandoned this idea in Acuff-Rose, by
stating that
"the task is not to be simplified with bright-line rules .... [T]he statute, like the doc-
trine it recognizes, calls for case-by-case analysis .... Nor may the four statutory
factors be treated in isolation, one from another. All are to be explored, and the re-
sults weighed together, in light of the purposes of copyright."
Id. at 564 (quoting Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 577-78).
122. PATR, supra note 121, at 567.
123. Id.
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In stating its findings that Harper & Row had proven actual dam-
ages, the Court, in dicta, discussed the fair use doctrine in
economic terms:
Economists who have addressed the issue believe the fair use
exception should come into play only in those situations in
which the market fails or the price the copyright holder would ask is
near zero. As the facts here demonstrate, there is a fully func-
tioning market that encourages the creation and
dissemination of memoirs of public figures. In the economists
view, permitting "fair use" to displace normal copyright chan-
nels disrupts the copyright market without a commensurate
public benefit.
12 4
Thus, the Court recognized that fair use might be eliminated if a
functioning market were in place so that the potential copyright
user could pay for the user of the material. To this end, the copy-
right holder would be more likely to defeat a claim of fair use and
succeed in a copyright infringement action if he could prove that a
mechanism existed for the user to pay for the desired use. There-
fore, it was to the benefit of the copyright owner to set up markets.
The Supreme Court's analysis is flawed in that it requires a circu-
lar analysis. Under the approach suggested in dicta, one must
assume that the copyright holder is entitled to fees and measure
their potential loss by reference to those lost fees. The assumption
that one is entitled to fees is problematic, however, since whether
one is entitled to those fees is the very question that the Court is
supposed to be answering. It overlooks the point that if a use is fair,
then no market should exist at all. By measuring the potential
damages when a market exists, the question of whether or not the
market should exist at all is precluded.
Despite the flawed reasoning, copyright holders took heed of
the Supreme Court's words. Copyright holders understood they
could more readily defeat a claim of fair use if they could prove the
existence of a working market. The market-based rationale was
found persuasive in two subsequent cases. In American Geophysical
Union v. Texaco, Inc.,2 5 American Geophysical Union and eighty-two
other publishers of scientific and technical journals brought an
action for copyright infringement against Texaco. Texaco's scien-
tists who were interested in certain research areas could subscribe
124. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 566 n.9 (emphasis added) (citing WendyJ. Gordon, Fair
Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and its Predecessors,
82 COLUM. L. REv. 1600, 1615 (1982)).
125. 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994).
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to certain "routing lists." Texaco's library then circulated current
issues of relevantjournals to names on routing lists. If a researcher,
who had been routed ajournal by the library, believed a particular
article would facilitate his current or future research, it was com-
mon practice for him to make photocopies for his files so that they
would be available for reference when needed. The plaintiff pub-
lishers claimed that Texaco's unauthorized photocopying of
articles from their journals constituted copyright infringement.
Texaco claimed that its copying was protected by fair use.
The court rejected defendant's fair use argument. In consider-
ing the fourth fair use factor, the court adopted a market-based
approach. The court recognized that publishers have traditionally
produced and marketed author's individual articles in journal
format and that publishers have "not traditionally provided a sim-
ple or efficient means to obtain single copies of individual
articles."126 The effect that photocopying has on the traditional
market for journal subscriptions is of less significance when a mar-
ket exists for sale of individual copies or articles. 127 Therefore, the
court focused the analysis of the fair use factor on the "effect of
Texaco's photocopying 'upon the potential market for or value' of
the individual articles."
2 8
Texaco argued that it was incorrect to determine the value of the
publisher's affected copyrights by assuming that publishers were
allowed to demand and received licensing royalties and fees. Tex-
aco argued that "whether the publishers can demand a fee for
permission to make photocopies is the very question that the fair
use trial is supposed to answer."2 9 The court agreed with Texaco-
but only in part. Texaco's allegation was true for uses in which the
creators of creative works were unlikely to license their works:
"[T] he law recognizes no derivative market for critical works."
,.. Only an impact on potential licensing revenues for tradi-
tional, reasonable, or likely to be developed markets should
be legally cognizable when evaluating a secondary use's "effect
126. Id. at 927. The court noted that reprints were available from publishers only in
large quantities and with delay.
127. Id. at 928. On the other hand, were publishers able to prove that Texaco's photo-
copying, if widespread, would impair overall marketability of journals, plaintiff's could
present a strong claim under the fourth fair use factor. Id.
128. Id. at 927.
129. Id. at 929.
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upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted
work.",
30
Here, even though publishers had not established a "conventional
market for the sale and distribution of individual articles," 3 the
Copyright Clearance Center (CCC) was a workable market for in-
stitutional users, like Texaco, to obtain licenses for the right to
produce their own copies of individual articles. The court re-
sponded to Texaco's circularity argument as follows:
[I] t is sensible that a particular unauthorized use should be
considered "more fair" when there is no ready market or
means to pay for the use, while such an unauthorized use
should be considered "less fair" when there is a ready market
or means to pay for the use. The vice of circular reasoning
arises only if the availability of payment is conclusive against
fair use .... [I] t is now appropriate to consider the loss of li-
censing revenues in evaluating "the effect of the use upon the
potential market for or value of"journal articles. 32
In Princeton University Press v. Michigan Document Services, Inc.,133
an Ann Arbor, Michigan, copy shop reproduced "coursepacks"
containing copyrighted works for professors without permission of
the copyright holders. The copy shop owner, who believed this
copying to be covered by the fair use doctrine, advertised that his
service was able to provide quicker service as he did not take the
time to get permission from the publishers. In this case, plaintiff
had setup workable markets.
34
In rejecting the defendant's fair use arguments, the court
adopted pro-market analysis used in American Geophysical and
Harper & Row. The defendant argued that the fourth fair use factor
should be measured by lost book sales instead of lost permission
fees since it was "circular to assume that a copyright holder is enti-
tled to permission fees and then to measure market loss by
130. Id. at 930 (quoting Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 592 (1994)).
131. Id. at 930.
132. Id. at 931 (emphasis added).
133. 99 F.3d 1381 (6th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
134. Plaintiff's publishers had set up departments that processed requests for permis-
sion to reproduce portions of copyrighted works. Additionally, a national clearinghouse
existed, the (CCC), through which copy shops could request and obtain permission to make
reproductions upon payment of licensing fees. The three plaintiffs were able to show that
they had been collecting permission fees at a rate approaching $500,000 per year. Id. at
1387.
[VOL. 35:4
Paradigm Shifts and Access Controls
reference to the lost fees.' ', 5 The court rejected this argument cit-
ing Texaco:
Where ... the copyright holder clearly does have an interest
in exploiting a licensing market-and especially where the
copyright holder has actually succeeded in doing so-"it is
appropriate that potential licensing revenues for photocopy-
ing be considered in a fair use analysis.
1 36
Thus, the courts have begun to embrace a market-based ap-
proach to fair use. The implication is that as viable markets
develop, fair use will constrict. However, in a recent case, the court
rejected the market-based argument because of its circularity. In
Hojheinz v. AMC Productions Inc.,"7 the court rejected a claim of
harm based on the licensing value of a work. Instead, the court in-
sisted that the relevant harm should be the effect the use would
have on the demand for the infringed works themselves, not the
ability to license. In that case, the defendant had used movie clips
and reproduction photographs and posters in a documentary
about a producer of "B" movies.
The court rejected plaintiff's market harm argument stating that
"if carried to its logical conclusion, [it] would eviscerate the af-
firmative defense of fair use since every copyright infringer seeking
the protection of the fair use doctrine could have potentially
sought a license from the owner of the infringed work.",38 The
court elaborated:
The very point of fair use is that, in certain circumstances, ...
the law will not require an infringer of a copyrighted work to
obtain such a license if it advances the overall goal of copy-
right-to create more works.... [PI]laintiff's argument fails to
acknowledge that a finding of fair use here does not translate
to a finding of fair use in each instance where plaintiff's copy-
righted works have been infringed. Thus, potential infringers
of plaintiff's copyrighted works, to the extent that they exist,
are likely to seek a license to avoid entering into the murky
realm of fair use law during the course of litigation. 39
135. Id.
136. Id. (quoting American Geophysica4 60 F.3d at 930).
137. 147 F. Supp. 2d 127 (E.D.N.Y. 2001).
138. Id. at 140.
139. Id. at 140-41 (citations omitted).
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In summary, like the rest of copyright law, the fair use doctrine
has begun to move from a fairness-based inquiry to a market-based
one. Under the fourth fair use factor, courts have begun to accept
the proof of lost licensing revenues as proof of market harm re-
gardless of whether fair use would in fact preclude the revenues in
the first place. If the recent Hofheniz case is any indication, courts
may start to swing back from market-centered analysis towards an
inquiry based on fairness and equitable factors.
D. Fair Use and the DMCA
In addition to further limiting the exclusive rights of copyright
users, the DMCA's anticircumvention prohibition excludes fair use
as a defense to actions brought under section 1201 (a). The exclu-
sion of fair use necessarily has First Amendment implications. 4
Congress debated the issue of fair use (as applied to the anticir-
cumvention prohibition) at a Congressional hearing on the
DMCA.14' Representatives of copyright industries used a "breaking
and entering" metaphor to describe circumvention activities and
argued against allowing fair use. According to this line of reason-
ing, fair use is not an acceptable reason to "break" a protection
system used to protect copyright owner's works. Allan Adler, testify-
ing on behalf of the Association of American Publishers stated that:
the fair use doctrine has never given anyone a right to break
other laws for the stated purpose of exercising the fair use
privilege. Fair use doesn't allow you to break into a locked li-
brary in order to make "fair use" copies of the books in it, or
steal newspapers from a vending machine in order to copy ar-
ticles and share them with a friend.
42
140. Traditionally, with regard to copyright infringement actions brought under 17
U.S.C. § 501, First Amendment doctrine has been incorporated into copyright by (1) the
idea/expression dichotomy; and (2) fair use. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000); Harper & Row, Pub-
lishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985).
141. WIPO Copyright Treaties Implementation Act, and Online Copyright Liability Limitation
Act; Hearing on HR. 2281 and H. K 2280 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property
of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 208 (1997).
142. WIPO Copyright Treaties Implementation Act, and Online Copyright Liability Limitation
Act: Hearing on HR. 2281 and H.R. 2280 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property
of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 208 (1997) (statement of Allan Adler, Asso-
ciation of American Publishers).
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Although in the end it was extremely persuasive, the "breaking
and entering metaphor" is misleading. Proponents of the "break-
ing and entering metaphor" neglected to mention that it is the real
property laws that give the locked doors their legitimacy.14 3 Under
the DMCA, unlike real property, one can apparently build a copy-
right fence around property one does not own. Without real
property rights, the metaphor fails.
1 44
In the final statute, advocates for fair use protection seem to
have lost. Although fair use, as codified in 17 U.S.C. 107, is a de-
fense to an action for copyright infringement brought under 17 U.S.C.
501, fair use, as codified in section 107 is not a defense to the cause
of action created by the anticircumvention prohibition of section
1201. "5 Instead, the drafters of the DMCA merely reiterated that
nothing in the DMCA limits "defenses to copyright infringement, in-
cludingfair use. ",1
6
Although the "fail safe" provisions of the DMCA were developed
as a compromise between advocates of fair use and the industry
opposed to it, 4 7 if the Librarian of Congress's first rulemaking is
any indication of the future, fair use will not find its way into the
DMCA's provisions any time soon. Consequently, speech thought
to be protected under the fair use doctrine may be restricted un-
der the DMCA. If copyright owners can "lock up" their works
digitally, then they may be able to prevent what would otherwise be
fair uses of copyrighted works by either bringing a civil cause of
action under section 1203 or threatening to bring one. Copyright
users, faced with potential or actual litigation, may be unwilling to
risk the financial loss.14 8 Consequently, copyright users may modify
143. LITMAN, supra note 8, at 133.
144. Litman argues that the breaking and entering metaphor allowed advocates of un-
conditional circumvention protection to "skip right past the question of whether what was
inside that lock was something they were entitled to prevent people from seeing." Id.
145. Exemption to Circumvention, 65 Fed. Reg. at 64,561 (2000). Cf Universal Studios
v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 323 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding Sony does not apply to the
DMCA violations since Sony "involved a construction of the Copyright Act that has been
overruled by the later enactment of the DMCA to the extent of any inconsistency between
Sony and the new statute"); RealNetworks, Inc. v. Streambox, Inc., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
1889, *22-24 (W.D. Wash. 2000) (holding that the standard set in by the Supreme Court in
Sony, which held that the sale of VCR's to the public did not constitute contributor) in-
fringement, does not apply to the DMCA's anti-trafficking provisions).
146. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(c) (2000) (emphasis added).
147. LITMAN, supra note 8, at 138-39.
148. Cf John Markoff, Scientists Drop Plan to Present Music-Copying Study that Record Indus-
try Opposed, N.Y. TIMES, April 27, 2001, at C5. A group of computer scientists who had
successfully defeated an industry copy-protection system abruptly withdrew the academic
paper based on their research. Id. The record industry claimed that disclosure of the re-
search violated the section of the DMCA [17 U.S.C. 1201(b)] which restricts disclosure of
SUMMER 2002]
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reforn
their behavior to prevent copyright owners from acting upon their
threat to bring litigation. As a result, users may modify their behav-
ior in ways that should not be necessary, further tipping the scales
in favor of copyright owner.
In summary, the fair use doctrine has been excluded from the
DMCA, further enabling the market-based approach to copyright
law. Since fair use is not a defense to an action brought under the
DMCA, users will be completely prohibited from using works to the
extent that copyright holders can lock-up their works with access
controls. Consequently, creation of new works will be impeded.1 49
III. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ANTICIRCUMVENTION PROVISIONS
Works of intellectual property have characteristics of "public
goods." From an economist's standpoint, the public goods aspect
of intellectual property results in market inefficiencies. 150 Because
of market inefficiencies, creative works are under-produced.
Copyright protection allows copyright holders to prevent others
from making unlawful uses of copyrighted works.1 5' Economists be-
lieve that copyright promotes optimal production, and thus
economic efficiency, of copyrighted works by
trad [ing] off the costs of limiting access to a work against the
benefits of providing incentives to create the work in the first
place. Striking the correct balance between access and incen-
tives is the central problem in copyright law. For copyright law
to promote economic efficiency, its principal legal doctrines
must, at least approximately, maximize the benefits from cre-
ating additional works minus both the losses from limiting
access and the costs of administering copyright protection.
5
1
Consequently, in order to achieve economic efficiency, copyright
law should maximize the difference between the benefits from
method used to break copy-protection systems. The decision to withdraw publication was
made because "[1]itigation is costly, time-consuming, and uncertain regardless of the merits
of the other side's case." Id.
149. Authors necessarily build on what came before them. Therefore, efficient creation
of new works requires access to and use of old ones. Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Im-
provement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEx. L. REv. 989 (1997).
150. Seediscussion infrain Part III.C.
151, William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18
J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 326 (1989).
152. Id. at 326 (emphasis added).
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creating additional copyrighted works minus the expenses of
limiting access and administering copyright protection. 5
With regard to fair use, economists believe that the fair use ex-
ception should only come into play in situations where the market
fails or the price that the copyright holder would ask is near zero.154
Access controls are intended to cure some of the problems pre-
sented by public goods and thus correct market inefficiencies. In
situations where access controls fail to correct market failure, fair
use, or some similar provision, must be incorporated into the
DMCA's anticircumvention prohibitions to assure continued access
to, and thus ensure optimal levels of creation of new works.
A. The Market for Copyrighted Works
In order to understand the economic analysis of access control
provisions of the DMCA, some basic microeconomic principles
must be understood. Goods, in this case copyrighted works, are
sold in markets. Marketplaces are places where buyers (copyright
users) and sellers (copyright holders) interact, resulting in the pos-
sibility of exchange.
1. Demand-The quantity of a copyrighted material buyers are
willing to purchase for each price per unit is illustrated by the de-
mand curve. 55 In general, buyers will buy more of a good the lower
its price. Therefore, the demand curve will generally slope down-
ward. 156
153. Id.
154. Gordon, supra note 124, at 1615.
155.
Price
PO----------
Demand
O Quantity
When the price equals P0, consumers will buy quantity equal to Q0.
156. Demand curve will likely be negatively sloped because although there will be sub-
stitutes, there will not likely be perfect substitutes for a copyrighted work. Landes & Posner,
supra note 151, at 326. The slope of a particular demand curve is dependent on the price
elasticity of demand. See discussion infra note 170.
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Consumers will consume copyrighted works until the marginal
benefit of consuming the next unit change is equal to the marginal
cost of the change. If marginal benefit of consumption exceeds the
marginal cost of consumption, it is to the consumer's advantage to
consume the next unit.1
57
2. Supply-The quantity of goods suppliers, authors of creative
works, are willing to sell for each price per unit is illustrated by the
supply curve. In general, the higher price, the more works authors
will be willing to create and sell. The supply curve will generally
slope upward.
158
The cost of producing a copyrighted work consists of (1) the
cost of initially creating the work;"59 and (2) the cost of producing
the work.CO An author will earn profits equal to the difference be-
tween his total revenue and total costs.'6 ' Consequently, an author
will not create a new work unless his expected return is expected to
exceed his expected costs.
62
Profit is maximized when the difference between total costs and
total revenue is maximized. Total costs consist of fixed costs plus
cost associated with producing each unit.163 This occurs when an
author produces a quantity of output whose marginal cost equals
its marginal revenue."
157. Note that consumer's benefit maximization is constrained by their disposable in-
come. ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND EcoNoMics 21 (2d ed. 1997).
158.
Prce
Suppy
PO----------
00 Ouantly
Supply curves are upward sloping. The higher price consumers are willing to pay, the
more copyrighted works producers will supply. When price equals P., suppliers will supply
quantity equal to Q0.
159. Landes& Posner supra note 151, at 326-27.
160. Id. at 327.
161. COOTER AND ULEN, supra note 157, at 25.
162. Landes & Posner, supra note 151, at 327. Although authors may receive nonmone-
tary benefits from producing copyrighted works, for the purposes of this analysis it is
assumed that benefits exclusively come from sale of copyrighted works.
163. ROBERTS. PINDYCK & DANIEL L. RUBINFELD, MICROECONOMiCS 242 (3d ed. 1995).
164. COOTER AND ULEN, supranote 157, at 25-26. Forageneral discussion of firm profit
maximization in competitive markets see PINDYCK AND RUBENFELD, supra note 163, at 240-
43. For a discussion of firm profit maximization in monopoly markets see id. at 320-23. The
formula makes sense. If a firm can achieve more revenue from producing one more item
than it occurs costs, it will benefit by producing more. Conversely, if the cost of producing
one more unit exceeds the revenues of producing it, a firm should not produce that unit.
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3. Market Clearing-In competitive markets, the two curves in-
tersect at the market equilibrium price. If a price is set above the
market price, a surplus of creative works will result as authors are
willing to create more works than buyers are willing to purchase.
' e"
Similarly, if the price is set below the market equilibrium price, a
shortage of creative works will result. Buyers will be willing to pur-
chase more creative works than authors are willing to supply. The
"market mechanism" is the tendency for the price to change until
the quantity demanded and quantity supplied are equal (i.e. the
market clears).
B. Do Copyrights Confer Monopoly Power?
An argument can be made that copyright provides owners a
monopoly because, in general, a copyright gives an owner the abil-
ity to limit use of a creative work protected by it.166 The ability to
enforce the monopoly would seem to be enhanced by the ability to
lock up a digital work using access controls. Therefore, one could
conclude that copyrights would result in market inefficiencies pro-
ducing higher prices than would be supported in a perfectly
competitive market. 
167
165.
Surplus
P12 4 , Supply
Demand
01 Q0 Quantity
Optimal price is P.. If price is set at P,, consumers will demand less, Q, than producers
are willing to supply. In the short-run, an inventory surplus will be created.
166. Lemley, supra note 149, at 1066. In a monopoly market, there is only one seller but
many buyers. PINDYCK AND RUBINFELD, supra note 163, at 320. If a monopolist raises prices,
there is no worry that competitors will steal customers by charging lower prices. Monopolists
maximize profits by cutting output and raising prices. For a general discussion of monopo-
lies and the market inefficiencies created by them see PINDYCK AND RUBINFELD, supra note
163, at 319-401. When profits are maximized consumer and social welfare will be reduced.
Lemley, supra note 149, at 1065-66.
167. Id. at 1066. Firms selling goods in a perfectly competitive market will sell goods at
the same price. Consequently, no one seller nor buyer can alone have a significant impact
on price. In competitive markets, a single price, the market price will prevail.
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While in some instances, a copyright may confer market power,
in others it will not. On one hand are "copyrighted works that con-
sumers consider irreplaceable."'6 If a copyright holder raises
prices, the quantity purchased will not fall very much if at all. Ex-
amples could include the private letters of J.D. Salinger and
photographs of the assassination of President Kennedy.' 6 Since
there are no close substitutes for these works, the demand for such
goods would be considered price inelastic. 170
On the other hand, there are "works for which (in the eyes of
consumers) there are readily available, nearly perfect substi-
tutes."1 7' If a copyright holder raises prices, the quantity purchased
will fall dramatically as consumers purchase substitutable copy-
righted works instead. Works meeting this description could
include B-grade movies.
1 72
Most types of copyrighted material fall somewhere in the mid-
dle. 73 When many substitutes are available, the demand for such
goods would be considered price elastic. v4 An example of a copy-
righted work that falls somewhere in the middle is a law school
textbook. Even though a buyer may prefer a certain textbook, if
the copyright holder raises the price too much the buyer will seek
out an appropriate substitute.
168. William W. Fisher III, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1659,
1703 (1988).
169. Id. at 1703 n.207.
170. PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 163, at 29. The measure of the sensitivity of one
variable to another is called elasticity. Specifically, it is the percentage change that will occur
in one variable in response to a one percent change in another. The price elasticity of de-
mand is
Ep = (%*Q)/(%oP)
where %*Q equals the percentage change in quantity and %*P is the percentage change in
price. Id.
Usually, when price increases demand will fall. Therefore, price elasticity of demand will
normally be a negative number. If percentage change in quantity drops faster than the per-
centage change in price, the price elasticity will be greater than one. When the price
elasticity is greater than one, demand is said to be price elastic. When demand is price elas-
tic, many substitutes exist. Id.
By contrast, when no close substitutes exist, demand will be price inelastic. An increase in
price will result in a smaller change in quantity demanded resulting in a demand price elas-
ticity of less than one. A completely inelastic demand curve exists when the price elasticity of
demand is zero. When price elasticity of demand equals zero, the consumer demand curve
is vertical. By contrast, when the demand curve is infinitely elastic, or horizontal, a tiny in-
crease in price leads to an enormous change in demand. Id. at 29-31.
171. Fisher, supra note 168, at 1703.
172. Id. at 1703 n. 207.
173. Id. Copyright holder has some market power and thus some ability to raise prices.
At a certain point, however, buyer will seek out substitutable goods.
174. See discussion supra note 170.
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For the purpose of the economic analysis in this Note, it will be
assumed that the type of copyrighted material falls somewhere in
the middle. In other words, the monopoly power conferred by
copyright, if any, is limited. Substitutes are available for each copy-
righted work. Consequently, the marketplace will be assumed to be
competitive. Consumers are willing to seek out substitute goods. If
a supplier of copyrighted work raises his price too much, consum-
ers will look elsewhere. Other potential suppliers of copyrighted
works will see an opportunity and enter the marketplace. The
competition will force the initial supplier to either lower prices or
lose business.
C. Copyrighted Works as Public Goods and Market Failure
From the standpoint of an economist, copyrighted works are a
problem because they are like public goods.175 Most public goods
can be characterized as nonrival and nonexclusive. 76 Goods are
nonrival when one person's use of that good does not stop others
from using it.' 7 Goods are nonexclusive when people cannot be
excluded from consuming them. 17 Therefore, once a copy of a
work protected by copyright is made available to others, it is often-
times inexpensive for a noncopyright holder to make additional
copies. 179 Consequently, payment is difficult or impossible to charge
people for using nonexclusive gods.
Copyrighted works are like public goods since they can be con-
sumed by many people without depletion and it is difficult to
identify those who will not pay and prevent them from using
them.'8 People who do not pay for their consumption of a public
good, in this case copyrighted works, are known as free riders.' 8'
175. Fisher, supra note 168, at 1700. For a discussion of public goods and the issues sur-
rounding them, see PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 163, at 648-58.
176. Non-intellectual property examples of public goods include national defense and
air pollution abatement. All consumers benefit from air pollution abatement regardless of
whether they pay for their share of it.
177. COOTER & ULEN, supra note 157, at 100. An example of a rival good is an apple.
Once the apple is consumed, others cannot eat it. Id. Goods are nonrival when for any given
level of production, the marginal cost, the cost associated with the consumption of one
additional unit, is zero. PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 163, at 648.
178. An apple is also an example of an exclusive good. Once it is purchased, I can keep
the general public from eating it.
179. Landes & Posner, supra note 151, at 326.
180. Lemley, supra note 149, at 994-95.
181. COOTER & ULEN, supra note 157, at 101.
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The nature of copyrighted works and the mediums used to dis-
tribute them make them particularly susceptible to free riders.
Copyrighted works are costly to produce initially.""s Yet, once the
work is produced, they are very inexpensive to transmit. 1 3 The dig-
itization of copyrighted works has further reduced transmission
costs bringing it close to zero. Consumers who desire to pay no
more than the cost of transmission of a copyrighted work will be-
come free riders'
84
In the market for copyrighted works, free-riders take several
forms. Perhaps, the most egregious form of free-ridership is piracy.
Piracy is defined as the "unauthorized and illegal reproduction or
distribution of materials protected by copyright." 85 The definition
of piracy has evolved over time. While the definition used to be
about people who made and sold large numbers of counterfeit
copies, 186 today the term seems to have been expanded to "to de-
scribe any unlicensed activity."187 Proponents of this expanded term
of piracy, mainly copyright holders, often ignore the fact that not
all unlicensed reproductions and distributions are illegal. 8 For the
purposes of this analysis, the term piracy will be used to refer to the
former type of piracy-that is, the creation and distribution of ille-
gal copies en masse, usually for profit. People who buy counterfeit
copies as opposed to actual copies of copyrighted works are free-
riders.
At the other extreme are free riders who make individual uses of
copyrighted materials without express permission of the copyright
holder. Under the fair use doctrine these people would often times
be granted permission under the (1) implied assent theory, or
(2) enforced consent theory.
189
182. Landes & Posner, supra note 151, at 326.
183. COOTER & ULEN, supra note 157, at 103.
184. Id. Without access controls, each time a producer of a copyrighted work sells to a
consumer, he runs the risk that the particular consumer will become his competitor. Lemley,
supra note 148, at 994-95. Buyers can compete by (1) loaning out works, (2) selling in sec-
ondary market (e.g. used book stores), (3) creating a legal copy for single distribution, or
(4) creating illegal copies for purpose of mass distribution. When buyers decide to resell
their works, producers, who must bear the cost of producing the work and transmission of
the work, are undercut by resellers who only bear the cost of the transmission. COOTER &
ULEN, supra note 157, at 117.
185. BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 1169 (7th ed. 1999).
186. LITMAN, supra note 8, at 85.
187. Id.
188. For example, under the Audio Home Recording Act of 1992, people are allowed
to make copies of CDs purchased or borrowed. 17 U.S.C. § 1008 (2000); LITMAN, supra note
8, at 85.
189. In the public debate over the public's right to access digital materials, most notori-
ously Napster, the content providers have framed the issue in terms of a "red-herring
question of whether music should be free. (It shouldn't.)" Thomas E. Weber, Why Gutting
[VOL. 35:4
Paradign Shfts and Access Contros
Consumers who purchase copyrighted works in secondary mar-
kets, for example used book stores, or who borrow copyrighted
works from libraries are also free riders in that the copyright owner
is unable to collect money from these users of their copyrighted
works.190 This type of free ridership has been expressly sanctioned
by copyright law's first-sale doctrine.'9
Free riders understate the total benefits produced by a copy-
righted work, thereby resulting in market inefficiency. Each
consumer's demand curve for copyrighted works shows the mar-
ginal private benefits enjoyed by that consumer.192 Because
copyrighted works are like public goods, free riders are able to
benefit from them also. To calculate the marginal benefits for all
people who enjoy copyrighted works, demand curves for all con-
sumers (paying and non-paying) must be added up vertically.
93
The sum represents the marginal benefit to society (MSB) of a
copyrighted work. The difference between the marginal society
benefits and the marginal benefits enjoyed by paying copyright us-
ers represents benefits of a work enjoyed by free riders. This is
sometimes called the marginal external benefit (MEB). The mar-
ginal social benefits are higher than the marginal benefits to the
individual consumer, resulting in underproduction of copyrighted
works. 1
94
Napster Won't Cure the Blues of the Music Industry, WALL ST. J., Mar. 26, 2001, at B1. What has
gotten lost in the debate is that people really like to get their music online. Id.
190. The public debate on the merits of access controls has largely focused on copy-
righted works from the entertainment industry. What has largely been missing in this
debate, however, is the effect that laws like the DMCA could have on institutions like public
libraries and secondary markets. See Thomas E. Weber, To Librarian in Queens, 'Fair Use,' 'First
Sale'Are Keys to Knowledge, WALL ST.J., April 9, 2001, at BI.
191. 17 U.S.C. § 109. Section 109(a) provides:
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106(3) [(the exclusive right to distribute
copies of a copyrighted work)], the owner of a particular copy or phonorecord law-
fully made under this title, or any person authorized by such owner, is entitled,
without the authority of the copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the pos-
session of that copy or phonorecord....
192. See PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 163, at 626.
193. Id. at 650. "When a good is nonrival, the social marginal benefit of consumption,
... is determined by vertically summing the individual demand curves for the good..." Id.
at 651.
194. In Figure 1, Q. is the optimal level of copyrighted works that should be produced
and P. is the optimal price. That price is too high for people who pay for copyrighted works.
The optimal price to people who pay is P,. At price Po, the quantity demanded will be equal
to Q, which is less than the optimal level.
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FIGURE 1
Price
Supply
PO
Marginal Social Benefits (MSB)=
benefits to individuals who pay+
Free Riders
Sum of Individuals' Demand =
Marginal Benefits
Q2 Qo Quantity
The demand curve (representing Marginal Social Benefits) in-
tersects the marginal cost curve at the efficient level of output (Q0)
and price (P0 ).195 At the efficient price the quantity that will be con-
sumed will be less than the optimal level (Q2). At the efficient
price, the supply will exceed demand for copyrighted works, result-
ing in a surplus. In the short-run, sellers will be unable to sell all of
their works at the optimal price creating a short-term surplus of
unsold works.
195. Id.
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FIGURE 2
PO - ----- - I
Marginal Social Benefits (MSB)=
benefits to individuals who pay+
Free Riders
, Individuals' Demand =
Marginal Benefits
Q2 Qo Quantity
In the long run suppliers of copyrighted works who are unable
to sell the optimal number of works at the optimal price will leave
the marketplace. Suppliers will leave the market, shifting the sup-
ply curve to left, resulting in fewer creative works being produced
and higher prices.1 9 6 Creative works are subsequently under-
supplied by would-be authors.' 97
In summary, the character of public goods prevents the use of
bargaining to achieve efficiency. 98 Market inefficiency occurs be-
cause the purchaser of a copyrighted work does not realize all of
the benefits by her purchase of the copyrighted work. Conse-
quently, the price is too high to encourage copyright purchaser to
buy the optimal level of copyrighted works.' 99 Suppliers will eventu-
ally leave the marketplace resulting in fewer copyrighted works and
higher prices.
196. Each producer will choose to consume at a level where the marginal benefit of
consuming is equal to his marginal costs (i.e. intersection of marginal cost and marginal
benefit curves.).
197. COOTER & ULEN, supra note 157, at 101.
198. Id.
199. See PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 163, at 626.
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D. Access Controls and Market Inefficiency
Access controls alter the "public good" nature of copyrighted
works, transforming copyrighted works into private property.
This transformation promotes the efficient consumption of copy-
righted works. While some free riders will be able to acquire access
to a copyrighted work from a copyright holder, others will not.
Thus, although access controls will correct some market inefficien-
cies, others will remain. Without a fair-use-like exception, certain
users will be completely excluded from using a copyrighted work.
With regard to the free riders who cannot successfully negotiate
the right to use a copyrighted work, the market will still fail.
1. How Access Controls Help Correct Inefficiencies-Under access
controls, copyrighted works that were once nonrival and nonexclu-
sive, now become exclusive. Consequently, free riders must either
buy from the copyright holder or else not use the work at all.20 The
difference between the sum total of individual demand curves and
the marginal social benefit derived from production of a copy-
righted work will decrease, resulting in consumption closer to the
efficient level. Thus, the power to exclude others fosters efficient
use or consumption of those goods.0 2
200. Access controls foster pay-per-use business model discussed supra Part II.
201. To the extent copyright holder's can "lock up" copyrighted works electronically,
secondary markets will eventually disappear.
202. COOTER & ULEN, supra note 157, at 101. In economic terms this is called "lubricat-
ing bargaining." Id.
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FIGURE 3
Price Supply
Po - - -----------
' Marginal Social Benefits (MSB)=
P2 benefits to individuals who pay+
Free Riders
New Individual's Demand
,/ (with partial Free Rider recapture)
I Sum of Individuals' Demand =
Marginal Benefits
Q2 Qo Quantity
2. Coase's Theorem How Access Controls Fail to Correct Inefficiencies-
Access controls are consistent with the trend of treating copy-
righted works like private property. When an owner can exclude
users from his property, people who want to use or consume the
203goods are forced to bargain with the primary property owner.
Consequently, free riders will be forced to bargain with the primary
property owner or risk doing without a copyrighted work.
This proposition is recognized in its own economic principle
201known as the Coase theorem. Under Coase's theorem, giving one
party, here the copyright holder, the power to control and orches-
trate all subsequent use of a copyrighted work should result in
efficient licensing, both to end-users and people who want to use a
copyrighted work to produce new copyrighted works. °
Three assumptions are made in order for this theory to hold
true. These assumptions are that (1) information is perfect,
(2) transaction costs are zero (i.e. licensing is costless), and
(3) parties are rational.2 ° In the world of access controls, each of
these assumptions is problematic.
First, information is imperfect. In most instances, consumers of
copyrighted works will be unsure of the utility they will receive
203. Id.
204. For a discussion of this theorem, see id. at 79-83.
205. Lemley, supra note 149, at 1046.
206. Id.
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from a copyrighted work until after they have it. °7 With works pro-
tected by access controls, the problem is exacerbated because
consumers cannot have the work, and therefore assess the value of
it, until after they pay for it.20 s Thus, the demand for information
presents a fundamental paradox: "its value for the purchaser is not
known until he has the information, but then he has in effect ac-
quired it without cost."
20 9
The assumption regarding transaction costs is also problematic.
Transaction costs are the costs of exchange. 210 The Coase theorem
suggests that assignment of private property rights will eliminate
transaction costs, thereby encouraging bargaining. Costs of
exchange fall into three categories: (1) search costs; (2) negotiation
costs; and (3) enforcement costs. 2
11
In the context of copyrighted works protected by access con-
trols, transaction costs would likely take the following forms.
Search costs would include the cost to users of identifying the
proper system from which to obtain a copyrighted work. Negotia-
tion costs would include the costs associated with following
procedures necessary to obtain a license. Enforcement costs would
be the costs associated with setting up and operating mechanisms
to control access and facilitate licensing of copyrighted works.1 2
Under the Coase theorem, when transaction costs are zero,
there is no need to specify legal rules in order to achieve efficiency
as private bargaining will take care of issues of what private owners
may and may not do with their property.213 Therefore, assigning
property rights can reduce transaction costs by defining clear, sim-
ple property rights in places where rights were formerly complex
214
and uncertain. For instance, if copyrighted works are locked up
via access controls, fair use arguably becomes irrelevant. Accord-
ingly, time and money would not be spent arguing whether the use
of a copyrighted work is excused by the doctrine of fair use. Nego-
tiation costs and/or enforcement costs would be reduced.
207. COOTER & ULEN, supra note 157, at 102-03.
208. Id. Under the DMCA a small exception exists for nonprofit libraries, archives, and
educational institutions since they are entitled to circumvent access controls "in order to
make a good faith determination of whether to acquire a copy of that work for the sole pur-
pose of engaging in conduct permitted [under Tide 17]." 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (d).
209. Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources, in THE RATE AND
DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS, 609, 615 (1962). This
famous paradox, first articulated by Kenneth Arrow, has become known as Arrow's informa-
tion paradox.
210. COOTER & ULEN, supra note 157, at 84.
211. Id.
212. In some instances these systems already exist in the form of CCC, ASCAP, and BMI.
213. COOTER & ULEN, supra note 157, at 79, 82.
214. Id. at 89-90.
[VOL. 35:4
Paradigm Shifts and Access Controls
Even though the use of access controls in some instances may
reduce costs of enforcing copyright law (or licensing agreements)
resulting in lower transaction costs, the assumption that transac-
tion costs will be completely eliminated is problematic. First, to the
extent a pay-per-use business model is facilitated by the access con-
trols, search costs will likely be increased. If a consumer must seek
out and purchase access to a work each time he desires the use of
it, it is likely that his overall search costs will be increased. Second,
copyright law, with its relaxed notice and registration require-
ments, does not facilitate costless identification of copyright
holders. For instance, copyright notice is not mandatory but
merely permissive.215 Even if copyright notice is provided, it can be
misleading.216 Further, registration of a copyrighted work with the
U.S. Copyright Office is not required.21 Therefore, consumers who
want to take advantage of copyrighted works protected by access
controls face significant search costs.
Once a copyright owner is located, the copyright user negotiates
acceptable terms with him.1 8 While, as discussed above, negotiation
costs can be reduced by the certainty provided by access controls,
other costs are unlikely to be completely eliminated. Negotiations
cost time and money. They may involve complex assignments of
partial legal rights and may involve lawyers and drafting fees. 2' 9 Ne-
gotiation costs can be reduced by shrink-wrap licensing
agreements, 220 however, those agreements are subject to overreach-
ing. In addition, shrink-wrapping licensing agreements are more
effective for licensing standard end-users of a copyrighted work
than for licensing the use of a copyrighted work to create a deriva-
tive work.21
215. 17 U.S.C. § 401(a). Although copyright notice is not mandatory, it is strongly en-
couraged since absence of copyright notice may give rise to a defense of innocent
infringement. 17 U.S.C. § 401(d).
216. For example, a single copyright notice on a collective work is sufficient to invoke
notice of copyright. 17 U.S.C. § 4 04 (a). However, it may not be sufficient to tell a copyright
user who the holder of that copyright is.
217. 17 U.S.C. § 408. Although copyright registration is permissive, a copyrighted work
must be registered with the Copyright Office before an infringement action is brought. 17
U.S.C. § 411. However, this provision comes too late to assist a potential user of a copy-
righted work try to find the owner of a copyrighted work for the purpose of negotiating a
license.
218. Lemley, supra note 149, at 1050-54.
219. Id. at 1053.
220. Id. at 1054.
221. Id.
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A successful negotiation results in the creation of an ongoing re-
222lationship between the parties that requires monitoring. Here,
access controls can significantly reduce the copyright holder's trans-
action costs associated with enforcement. Without access controls,
monitoring is difficult. Once a violation is discovered, a copyright
holder is forced to resort to the courts to enforce use agreements.
Access controls will lower enforcement costs for copyright holders
by preventing the very use requiring enforcement. Conversely, ac-
cess controls will increase enforcement costs for copyright users. In
the event that a copyright user is wrongly excluded from using a
work he has negotiated for the right to use, his transaction costs
will be increased as he seeks to enforce the negotiated agreement.
In short, while certain transaction costs may be reduced by access
controls, other transaction costs may increase thus rendering inva-
lid Coase's required assumption that transaction costs are zero.
Finally, the most problematic of Coase's required assumptions is
the assumption that copyright holders will act rationally. It is a
fundamental principal of economic analysis that decision-makers
act rationally-that is for each alternative available, a decision
maker will calculate the costs and choose the alternative that offers
the greatest net benefit.223 Copyright owners can't be counted on to
act rationally-at least in a strict economic sense. Copyright owners
may make strategic decisions that result in unavailability of access-
controlled work. For example, copyright owner may strategically
deny access to a work in order to prevent competition in the mar-
ketplace.224
Additionally, the use of copyrighted works can impose psychic
costs upon the copyright holder resulting in refusal of the copy-
righted owner to let someone use the work . Other works are
susceptible to idiosyncratic refusals.Y
Similarly, an author may refuse to let someone use a work pro-
tected by access controls when he is aware, or afraid, that his work
222. Id. at 1053.
223. COOTER & ULEN, supra note 157, at 296.
224. Lemley, supra note 148, at 1058-59.
225. Id. at 1060.
226. For example, the trusts of Margaret Mitchell, who authored Gone With The Wind,
have so far refused to license Alice Randall's derivative work, The Wind Done Gone. The Wind
Done Gone retells Mitchell's story from the perspective of a slave, Scarlett O'Hara's half sister
to be exact. Among other things, the trusts insist that any work written contain "no miscege-
nation or homosexuality and that Scarlett could not die." David D. Kirkpatrick, Writers Tough
Lesson in Birthin' a Parody, N.Y. TIMES, April 26, 2001, at El. In addition, songwriter Sarah
McLachlan refused to license the use of her song, "I Will Remember You," to the University
of Michigan Law School on the senior videotape, stating that the song was extremely per-
sonal to her. In both situations, new works were prohibited from being created.
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would be criticized, ridiculed, parodied. The copyright owner
may just not like the person who wants to license his work. This
may be especially true if the person wishing to obtain a license is a
competitor.
28
In short, the three assumptions on which the Coase theorem re-
lies are not likely to be true in most cases. Consequently, access
controls which act to transform copyrighted works into private
property will not result in an efficient use of resources, here copy-
righted works.
In addition to being based on questionable assumptions, the
Coase theorem fails to account for externalities.229 Some copy-
righted works produce social benefits not captured by the works
owner. For example the author of an article published in a scien-
tific journal is not paid directly but rewarded by prestige conferred
on him. The author's contribution to science may be significant.
Because the author is not directly compensated based on "how
valuable their ideas are, ... they may not be willing to pay for the
right to quote prior scholars, notwithstanding the social value that
such a quotation would add to the article." ° In such a situation,
without fair use, the efficient production of copyrighted works
would be impaired.
IV. REFORM
Access controls transform copyrighted works, from nonexclusive
goods to exclusive goods. In doing so, users of copyrights are
forced to bargain with copyright owners. Although it is likely that
the use of access controls would lubricate bargaining in certain in-
stances, in others bargaining would break down. Agreements
would likely be successfully negotiated in instances where use of a
work would be considered fair use under the "implied assent" the-
ory. However, it is unlikely that agreements would be struck in
other situations-specifically in situations where use of a work
would be allowed as fair use under the "enforced assent" theory. In
227. In such a situation, it may be perfectly rational in the economic sense to refuse the
license. Lemley, supra note 149, at 1060 (A negative review may adversely affect sales of the
copyright holder's work).
228. Id. at 1061.
229. Externalities arise when the action of one party benefits, or imposes costs on, an-
other party. PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 163, at 624.
230. Lemley, supra note 149, at 1057.
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addition, secondary markets will likely shrink to the extent that
access control measures preclude the reselling and lending of pur-
chased works. Users denied access in secondary markets will either
be deprived of access to a copyrighted work altogether or be forced
to purchase works in the primary market. Users may decline to
purchase works in primary markets especially in cases where exter-
nalities are present. To the extent a user is deprived of access to a
work completely, efficient creation of new works will be impeded
2
1
and the level of works produced can be expected to fall.
Economists argue that the best economic case for intellectual
property can be made out when asymmetric market failure is pre-
sent. 23 2 That analysis can be easily extended to the access control
provisions of the DMCA. According to economists, asymmetric
market failure exists when two conditions converge:
1. [A]uthors and inventors would not be able to ob-
tain much payment for their work in absence of a
rule that restrained strangers from copying, and as a
result, potential creators produce fewer works than
the public would have been willing to pay for.
2. [O]nce [the access controls are] in place, licensing
will evolve.233
The implication of the second condition is that once a rule re-
straining people from using or copying protected works is in place,
then markets will succeed. In cases where markets won't succeed,
other measures are required.34 Here, as discussed above, licensing
will likely evolve in situations in "implied assent" cases. That is in
fact a situation that would normally qualify for fair use, owners will
be likely to license the right to use the works to consumers. How-
ever, there are clearly situations in which copyright owners will
refuse a license. Such are the cases the fair use doctrine would
normally "enforce consent" on copyright owners.
In such instances, fairness and even economic analysis dictates
that provision must be made in our laws for those uses. Section
1201 (a) (1) (A) of the DMCA should be modified as follows:
231. Knowledge is cumulative. Authors build necessarily on what came before them. See
generally, Lemley, supra note 149.
232. WendyJ. Gordon, Asymmetric Market Failure and Prisoner's Dilemma in Intellectual Prop-
erty, 17 U. DAYTON L. REv. 853,854 (1992).
233. Id.
234. This is the same approach followed by market-based proponents of fair use. See
discussion supra Part II.C.
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No person shall circumvent a technological measure that ef-
fectively controls access to a work protected under this title for
the purposes of copyright infringement.
Such a modification would bring equity and fair use into the
DMCA. Access controls would be allowed to operate to prevent
mass piracy. Access controls would not prevent circumvention in
instances where fair use would prevent a finding of copyright in-
fringement. In cases where people make a good faith effort to
license access are still refused, fair use would allow it. Access con-
trols should not be allowed to short-circuit fair use to the
detriment of copyright users.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the DMCA provision authorizing access controls
measures and penalizing circumvention of them continues the
trend of treating intellectual property like private property. Access
controls not only prevent end-users from enjoying copyrighted
works, but also block potential authors from utilizing works in the
creation of new works in ways that were formerly allowed prior to
enactment of the DMCA. Although access controls correct some
market inefficiencies, they do not correct all of them. Without
modification the DMCA will prevent optimal creation and utiliza-
tion of copyrighted works. Therefore, Congress should amend the
DMCA. The prohibition against circumvention of access controls
can be maintained. The goal of optimally "promot[ing] Progress of
Science and the useful Arts' '235 can only be attained if copyright us-
ers are allowed to continue using materials that in the context of a
fair use analysis would be considered fair.
235. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, c. 8.
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